Introduction
The limited progress of the multilateral trade agenda in the last two decades has prompted countries to increasingly pursue regional and bilateral trade integration as an alternative. The number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in force and notified to the WTO more than quintupled between 1990 and 2015 (Hofmann et al., 2018) . Not only has the number of trade agreements proliferated, but so has their 'depth' -or the extent to which they cover areas beyond tariff reductions, such as customs regulations, anti-dumping, countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS), services and investment provisions.
These deep agreements are poised to generate significant economic effects on the member countries, although some sectors and segments of the population could be negatively affected. The literature on distributional aspects of free trade agreements is still limited. Understanding these impacts would be important. First, it would allow policy makers to better evaluate the costs and benefits of the agreements. Second, it can help prepare measures to compensate the likely losers of the agreements. Third, it could help policy makers focus on the parts of the agreement yielding the highest returns. This paper helps fill this gap by providing novel estimates of the economic effects of some major PTAs on Indonesia. This is a relevant focus as Indonesia is the largest economy in Southeast Asia, a region with a historically low incidence of deep agreements compared to other Asian countries like Japan and the Republic of Korea. That appears to be rapidly changing, as Southeast Asian countries are increasingly involved in negotiations of deep PTAs. Indonesia is a case in point with the recent signing of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries, and ongoing negotiations in the context of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), as well as CEPAs with the EU and Australia.
The paper employs a global dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model along with a micro-simulation tool to estimate the general equilibrium and distribution effects of various PTAs being negotiated or considered by Indonesia. The analysis focuses on two key PTAs that Indonesia is currently negotiating: RCEP, which is negotiated among 16 Asian economies, and the EU-IDN CEPA. 2 To provide some benchmarking, the paper also examines the potential impacts of two further important agreements that Indonesia may be joining in the foreseeable future: the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the FTAAP (Figure 1) . The former has been signed last March by the 12 member countries of the now defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) except the United States. Indonesia has recently signaled its intention to eventually join the CPTPP. 3 The FTAAP is an agreement among 21 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies, which aims to link Pacific Rim economies from China to Chile including also the United States.
The analysis employs the LINKAGE model, which is a dynamic global CGE model particularly suited to capture the feedback mechanisms of trade shocks across countries. On the basis of trade and relative prices channels, the model evaluates the impact of a reduction of tariffs and NTMs brought about by the prospective agreements. The CGE model is then combined with the Global Income Distribution Dynamics (GIDD) microsimulation tool to study the impact of these potential PTAs on poverty and shared prosperity. In particular, GIDD distributes the macro-economic effects captured by the CGE analysis across households using Indonesia's National Socio-Economic Household Survey for the year 2014.
The results of the analysis suggest that out of the PTAs under investigation, the EU-CEPA would yield the largest macro-economic gains for Indonesia in terms of income, output and exports. Relative to the business as usual baseline scenario, Indonesian GDP is expected to increase by 2.13% as a result of the EU-IDN CEPA, compared to 0.18% and 0.89% in case of RCEP and FTAAP respectively. The large impact of the EU-IDN CEPA is mainly driven by the highest expected reductions in trade barriers and the high share of international trade between the partners. The signing of the CPTPP in its current 11-member version would have negligible impact on Indonesia due to the very low trade diversion compensated by the trade creation related to the agreement. On the other hand, joining the CPTPP along with other major Southeast Asian economies would generate a positive economic impact for Indonesia with an expected 0.58% increase in GDP.
These macro effects translate into reductions of poverty, albeit the growth incidence curves (along the income distribution) have important differences between the agreements. The EU-IDN CEPA yields the highest expected growth of income relative to the other PTAs at every point of the income distribution. However, the size of the gains grows monotonically with income for the EU-3 See: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/18/indonesia-is-on-path-to-joining-the-trans-pacific-partnership-financeminister-says.html. IDN CEPA while the growth incidence curve has a U-shape in the case of RCEP, and a mildly inverted U-shape for the other agreements. The regressive nature of the EU-IDN CEPA is mainly due to the increase in skill wage premia spurred by the additional demand for skill intensive sectors, services in particular.
The paper contributes to the large literature on the ex-ante impact of PTAs. The attention surrounding the negotiations of the original TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has reinvigorated this line of research. Given the depth of these agreements, studies have tried to incorporate as broad an array of policy changes as possible. Petri and Plummer (2016) focus on the impact of the original TPP on the 12 member countries using a global CGE model incorporating tariff and non-tariff measures in goods and non-tariff measures in services. Ciuriak and Xiao (2014) consider the economic impact of Taiwan, China's TPP accession on the United States. Francois et al. (2015) examine the effects of the TTIP on the agreement's members, the European Union and the United States. A common finding in these studies is that the reduction in non-tariff barriers typically exerts a larger impact than the reduction in tariffs, underscoring the increasing importance of NTMs as a trade barrier, a finding also reiterated here. This paper complements this literature in two key ways. First it provides results for a host of different agreements, which allows comparing between them, an ever more important feature for policy makers facing a multitude of potential (and at times competing) PTAs. Second, it distributes the general equilibrium effects across the income distribution, again a key piece of information for policy makers interested in reducing poverty and inequality.
The paper also relates to the specific literature on the economic impact of trade policy in Indonesia. Much of this literature is empirical mainly looking at the ex-post impact of import tariff liberalization on measures such as firms' performance (Amiti and Konings, 2007; Narjoko et al., 2018) , wage premia (Amiti and Cameron, 2012) and poverty (Kis-Katos and Sparrow, 2015) . Duggan et al. (2013) also look at the impact of liberalization of foreign investments in services (equivalent to a reduction of NTMs on services) on manufacturing productivity. The approach of these studies is inevitably partial equilibrium; Mahadevan et al. (2017) is closer to the spirit of this paper in that it assesses the general equilibrium and distributional impact of proposed increases in import tariffs on the Indonesian economy. In line with the empirical assessments, the authors find that the effects of increased protectionism are negative both overall and along the entire income distribution. This paper complements this Indonesia-specific literature by considering a different type of trade policy shock, which involves a wider array of trade measures than just tariffs and requires a multi-country modeling framework to properly capture feedback mechanisms that propagate across countries.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the simulation models used in the analysis; section 3 describes the different scenarios modeled and some of the key assumptions behind them; section 4 presents the general equilibrium results; section 5 links these results to the 5 micro-simulation model to derive the distributional effects of the scenarios; and section 6 concludes.
Methodology

CGE model
Building on recent work of Plummer (2016), Petri et. al. (2012) and World Bank (2016a and b) , the backbone of the economic modeling would be obtained by using the global dynamic CGE model LINKAGE (van der Mensbrugghe, 2011). The analysis includes 17 production sectors and 35 countries/ regions (see Table A1 in the Annex) and simulates the impacts of policy changes up to 2030, including reduction of tariffs and of NTMs in goods and services.
The core specification of the model replicates largely a standard global dynamic CGE model. Production is specified as a series of nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions for the various inputs -unskilled and skilled labor, capital, land, natural resources (sector-specific), energy and other material inputs. LINKAGE uses a vintage structure of production that allows for putty-semi putty capital. In the labor market we assume fixed unemployment and labor participation rates. Demand by each domestic agent is specified at the so-called Armington level, i.e., demand for a bundle of domestically produced and imported goods. Armington demand is aggregated across all agents and allocated at the national level between domestic production and imports by region of origin.
The standard scenario incorporates three closure rules. First, government expenditures are held constant as a share of GDP, fiscal balance is exogenous while direct taxes adjust to cover any changes in the revenues to keep the fiscal balance at the exogenous level. The second closure rule determines the investment-savings balance. Households save a portion of their income, with the average propensity to save influenced by elderly and youth dependency rates, as well as GDP per capita growth rates. The savings function specification follows Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000) with different coefficients for developed and developing countries. In the case of China and the Russian Federation, we target projections of investment or savings rates up to 2030 from World Bank regional reports. Since government and foreign savings are exogenous, investment is savings driven. The last closure determines the external balance. We fix the foreign savings and therefore the trade balance, hence changes in trade flows result in shifts in the real exchange rate.
This modeling framework allows to incorporate the complex interactions of productivity differences at the country, sector or factor level, shifts in demand as income rises, as well changes in comparative advantage and trade flows following trade liberalization. The applied multiregional dynamic CGE model accounts simultaneously for interactions among producers, 6 households and governments in multiple product markets and across several countries and regions of the world. The model incorporates well-developed dynamic features such as accumulation of capital through changes in savings and investment.
It is also worth noting some of the key limitations of the model, including the lack of positive dynamic feedback loops concerning the accumulation of knowledge and the absorption of foreign technology through PTAs-facilitated FDI. It also does not allow for modeling of extensive margins in exports. Therefore, the gains captured here may underestimate the eventual impact and represent the lower bound of potential benefits. In contrast, PTA-driven productivity increases in member countries could undermine the competitiveness of non-member countries and exacerbate the detrimental effects on non-member countries. 4
Micro-simulation model
The impact of PTAs is differentiated across different types of households and workers. Such heterogeneity is key in determining the poverty and distributional impacts of any trade agreement. We use the GIDD modeling framework in order to model these distributional consequences of the macro-economic results of the PTAs. 5 The GIDD is a top-down macro-micro simulation framework, which distributes the macroeconomic results of the CGE model to households using SUSENAS 2014 as the source of data. The microeconomic model distributes the effects while keeping consistency with the aggregate behavior observed in the macro model. The two models operate mainly through changes in labor supply, skill formation, and real earnings, as a result, they are linked through key specific variables that reflect these changes (see Annexes 1 and 2 for details).
The micro simulation framework is performed in 5 steps. Steps 1 to 4 change the distribution of benefits across individuals, keeping the national average intact; while step 5 applies a distributional-neutral growth for all individuals. Briefly explained, step 1 changes the demographic structure of the household survey according to exogenous population and education projections. The second step allows for the migration of labor from shrinking to expanding sectors in the economy while changes in skill and sectoral wage premia are modeled in step 3.
Step 4 adjusts for 4 Another limitation of the model is that it does not incorporate the intended harmonization of labor and environmental standards within the CPTPP. While such harmonization has social and environmental benefits, it may also reduce competitiveness of firms that currently do not meet such standards, reducing the potential economic gains. 5 GIDD was developed by the World Bank's Development Prospects Group and was inspired by previous efforts involving top-down simulation exercises. See Bourguignon, F., Bussolo, M., and Pereira da Silva, L. A. (2008) ; Davies (2009) . Earlier versions of the GIDD can be found in Bourguignon and Bussolo (2013); and Bussolo, De Hoyos, and Medvedev (2010a, b) . Recent modeling applications include distributional assessments of the effects of demographic change ; Africa's resilience to climate, violence, and global economic stagnation (Devarajan et al., 2015) , deeper regional trade integration in Eastern Africa (Balistreti et al., 2016) , or the poverty and shared prosperity effects of China's economic slowdown and rebalancing (Lakatos et al., 2016) . changes in the relative prices faced by consumers. Lastly, step 5 accounts for economy-wide changes in per capita household consumption growth. 6
Scenarios and assumptions
We first generate the long-term baseline, then run a number of counterfactual scenarios. By comparing the two, we can isolate the impacts of various policy changes.
Baseline
The GTAP 9 database is benchmarked to 2011. We run the model to 2018, replicating the key macroeconomic aggregates from the World Bank's Global Economic Prospects report (World Bank 2016a). 7 Population growth is based on the medium fertility variant of the 2012 UN's population projections. Labor force growth follows the growth of the working age populationdefined here as the demographic cohort between 15 and 64 years of age. The evolution of supply of skilled and unskilled workers is consistent with the IIASA constant educational trends (CER) scenario, where growth rates of the supply of skilled workers exceed that of unskilled. Capital accumulation is equated to the previous period's (depreciated) capital stock plus investment. Productivity growth in the baseline is "calibrated" to achieve the growth rates for the baseline scenario (as in the World Bank (2016a)) up to 2018, then we fix the productivity growth for 2018-2030 to be consistent with historical trends. These productivity growth rates remain fixed in the counterfactual scenarios.
The baseline scenario also incorporates tariff reductions in existing PTAs. These are based on the data set provided by International Trade Center, including all TPP members FTA commitments up to 2030 (ITC and MAcMap (2015) ). In addition, the baseline also includes pre-existing trade agreements among member countries (e.g., NAFTA, AFTA, the ASEAN-Japan FTA, the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA and the P4 Agreement among Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand).
RCEP, FTAAP and EU-IDN CEPA
RCEP and FTAAP scenarios include liberalization of tariffs and NTMs following Wignaraja et. al. (2015) . Initial tariffs are based on the GTAP data whereas NTMs are provided by Petri and Plummer (2016) . The (trade-weighted) ad valorem equivalent NTMs for the different scenarios are reported in Table 1 . For the countries that are also CPTPP members we use the CPTPP tariff schedules from ITC and MAcMap (2015) and MAcMap (2016) . In case of RCEP, the 8 implementation of agreement is assumed to start in 2017 and import tariffs among the 16 members 8 are gradually reduced starting with a decline by 24% in 2017 up to 89% in 2027. In case of FTAAP, its implementation is assumed to start in 2021 and import tariffs among the member countries 9 are also gradually reduced starting with a decline by 46% in 2021 up to 94% in 2030. The EU-IDN CEPA is simulated using the assumptions for the EU-Vietnam FTA provided by Petri and Plummer (2016) . Hereby, the initial GTAP tariffs are gradually reduced starting with a fall by 55% in 2018 and up to 94% in 2030. 
TPP -11 (CPTTP)
This scenario models the planned tariff cuts in accordance with the provisions of CPTPP among the members and on several key assumptions about the theoretically desirable and politically feasible ("actionable") cuts in NTMs and the actual cuts likely to follow from the implementation of the CPTPP. Although the agreement has to be ratified by all member countries, executed simulations assume its implementation will begin in 2017.
Tariff cuts under the existing PTAs as well as tariff commitments under the TPP follow the published schedules under the agreements as documented in ITC and MAcMap (2015) and MAcMap (2016) . The authors document tariff reductions due to the existing PTAs signed by CPTPP members up to 2031 as well as the CPTPP commitments up to 2046 at the HS6 digit level.
Reductions in actionable NTMs follow the approach of Petri and Plummer (2016) and are assumed to be similar to the agreement between Korea and the United States (KORUS), including some 9 modifications based on analysis of the CPTPP text. NTMs for goods are constructed from the 2012 update of estimates by Kee et al. (2008) and the services barriers are based on estimates by Fontagné et al. (2011) . Only three-quarters of measured barriers are considered as actual trade barriers, the rest is assumed to represent quality-increasing regulations (e.g., product safety standards). Further, only three-quarters of the remaining NTMs in the case of goods and one-half in the case of services are assumed to be actionable (i.e., politically feasible in a trade agreement), the rest is assumed to be beyond the reach of politically viable trade policies. 10 NTMs are modeled as iceberg trade cost. These are non-revenue generating costs, which allow for trade to expand if these costs are reduced. For example, if iceberg trade costs are equal to 0.9 for some transport node, that means that if 100 units leave port r, the destination port, r', receives only 90 units.
TPP-15 (CPTTP+)
Under this scenario TPP-11 is expanded to include Indonesia, the Philippines, Korea and Thailand in 2019. By comparing TPP-11 with TPP-15 we can evaluate the opportunity costs of Indonesia remaining outside of the agreement. In this simulation we use the same assumptions for the 11 CPTPP members as in the previous scenario. But in TPP-15 scenario the aforementioned assumptions about NTMs also hold for the new countries joining CPTPP. Tariffs in the four new CPTPP members are based on the GTAP values which are gradually reduced starting with a decline by 65% in 2019 up to 99% in 2028.
Macro-economic effects of PTAs
The results of the analysis suggest that of the PTAs under investigation, the EU-CEPA would yield the largest macro-economic gains for Indonesia in terms of income, output and exports, as illustrated in Figure 2 and Table 2 . Relative to the business as usual baseline scenario, Indonesian GDP is expected to increase by 2.13% (or 54 billion USD) by 2030 as a result of the EU-IDN CEPA, compared to 0.18%, 0.58% and 0.89% in case of RCEP, TPP-15 and FTAAP, respectively.
The large impact of the EU-IDN CEPA is mainly driven by the mutual highest expected reductions in trade barriers (see e.g. Table 1 above for NTMs) and by the high share of international trade between the partners, as the EU accounts initially for 12% of total exports and 11% of total imports. Indonesia faces relatively high protection in the EU markets. 11 While the estimated trade-weighted average tariff that Indonesia faces in the EU markets is close to zero (0.02%), the NTMs are the highest among all considered PTAs. In particular, the trade-weighted average NTM in trade with the EU equals 15.42% with the highest values in food processing (40.88%), communication and business services (40.23%), construction (32.47%), trade and transport (32.03%), agriculture (31.81%) and textiles (30.82%). Regarding tariffs, the highest ones are observed for wearing apparel (7.4%), textiles (6.58%), food processing (5.67%) and transport equipment (4.13%) -see Figure 3 . In addition, Indonesian tariffs and NTMs are even higher for European goods and services. The trade-weighted average tariff in Indonesia is 3.38% while the average ad valorem equivalent of NTM equals 26.29% with the highest values in services ranging from 30.4% in social services up to 51.42% in communication and business services.
The substantial reduction in tariffs and non-tariff barriers leads to higher imports, which would expand by 6.72% relative to the baseline with total imports from the EU increasing by almost 90%. Total exports are expected to grow even more substantially than imports with a 7% growth rate compared to the baseline, while the EU becomes a much more important destination for Indonesian exports (the EU share in Indonesian export basket in 2030 increases from 9.8% in the baseline to 18.6%). At the same time, the share of non-EU countries in Indonesian exports declines by 8.8 percentage points (from 90.2% in the baseline to 81.4%).
Reduction of barriers could further deepen the country's specialization in manufacturing sectors (e.g., textiles, wearing apparel) by providing access to cheaper imported intermediates. The distributional effects -reported in more detail below -show that while capital remuneration increases only by 0.01 percentage points, unskilled and skilled labor gain the most (increase in wages by 0.08 and 0.06 percentage points compared to the baseline) due to labor-intensive production in expanding manufacturing and services sectors.
The largest gains of output and exports as a result of the EU-IDN CEPA are likely to occur in wearing apparel, textiles, food and beverages among good sectors. Services are among the largest NTMs faced by Indonesia 12 beneficiary sectors from the agreement, including trade and transport, construction, financial and business services. In terms of growth rates, the production of textiles is projected to increase by almost 40% while exports expand by 68%. For apparel and footwear, the rise of output reaches 76%, while exports increase by 117%, mainly at the back of strong reduction in tariffs and NTMs in the EU. Given their small initial shares in the Indonesian economy (2% for textiles and 1% for apparel), the high growth rates of output and exports in these sectors do not translate into huge absolute increases. In particular, the absolute output gains in textiles and apparel sectors constitute about 55% of total gains, while the aforementioned services account for 33%.
This sectoral growth in production is partly fueled by a reallocation of production factors. Increased production in the liberalized sectors is projected to drive resources away from natural resources provision and manufacturing sectors such as chemicals, machinery and equipment, other manufacturing, transport equipment and metallurgy, reducing their output and exports.
The EU-IDN CEPA is projected to induce an increase of imports in all sectors, with the highest changes in services (trade and transport, financial services) as well as in textiles and wearing apparel (see Figures 4 and 5). Moreover, looking at the trade flows with the EU and non-EU countries, we observe a strong diversion of Indonesian exports away from non-EU countries, particularly for agricultural products (-36%) as well as for food and beverages (-7%).
The strong expansion of textiles and wearing apparel occurs not only due to the slashing of trade barriers, but also due to better access to intermediate inputs. Both sectors produce with a very high share of intermediate inputs: 70% in textiles and 63% in wearing apparel. 12 The trade agreement leads to an overall reduction of prices for products that are most important intermediates in those sectors, namely wearing apparel, textiles and trade and transport services (approximately by 2 percentage points in textiles and wearing apparel, and by almost 1 percentage point in trade and transport services compared to the baseline). Imports of textiles and wearing apparel increase strongly as a large share is used as intermediate input. 13 Despite this increase in imports, the import intensity of output declines in textiles (-2 percentage points) and wearing apparel (-2.9 percentage points) as the domestic supply of these intermediates increases faster.
Trade and transport services also expand mainly due to a higher demand by all other sectors which use these services as an input to production. At the other end of the spectrum, the small expected impact of RCEP is driven by already low levels of protection among the member countries. Due to the economic integration within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and with further countries (e.g., PTAs between ASEAN and China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, Korea, as well as Japan-Indonesia CEPA), the trade-weighted average tariffs that Indonesia faces in other RCEP members range from zero in Singapore up to 5% in India. The Indonesian trade-weighted average import tariff vis-àvis other RCEP members is also very low at 0.3%. The highest average import tariffs on Indonesian products occur in food processing (6.23%), agriculture (1.41%) and transport equipment (1.03%). NTMs levels are also small. The trade-weighted average value in other RCEP countries amounts to 7.10% while the Indonesian average (ad valorem equivalent) NTM is the lowest among the agreements considered here, with a value of 3.02%. Although the trade-weighted averages are quite small, NTMs faced by Indonesia in RCEP countries are very high in certain sectors. The highest barriers occur in services such as communication (57.19%), finance and other business Imports 15 services (33.89%), construction (30%), social services (28.38%), trade and transport (23.95%) as well as in food processing (25.93%) and agriculture (13.65%) ( Figure 6 ).
As a result of the low initial level of protection and the assumed less ambitious level of commitments for RCEP vis-à-vis the other agreements, the expected reduction of tariffs and NTMs is relatively small. The highest reduction in the trade-weighted import tariff is expected in India (2.9 percentage points) and China (1.6 percentage points) while the average NTM that Indonesia faces on the RCEP markets falls only by 1.64 percentage points. As illustrated in Figure 6 , the highest reduction of trade barriers should occur in services sectors (communication, finance and other business services, construction, trade and transport) as well as in food processing, agriculture, wearing apparel and textiles.
Although the reduction of trade barriers is quite low, RCEP agreement enables a better access to a large number of growing markets and therefore some increase in participation in global value chains. Economic integration with 16 countries of the region induces a boost of Indonesian income by almost 10 billion USD, a GDP increase of 0.18% by 2030 compared to the baseline. Reduction of trade barriers leads to higher exports and imports, which expand by over 1.5% relative to the baseline. However, the agreement induces also some trade diversion with a reduction of Indonesian exports to non-member countries by 2.5%.
The largest expansion of output and exports as a result of relatively high reduction of trade barriers between the RCEP members are expected to occur in food and beverages, machinery and equipment, metals, agriculture as well as in several services sectors like trade and transport, construction, financial and business services (see Figure 7) . 15 Output of food products and beverages increases by 2.8% while its exports expand by 9.5% compared to the baseline. The production and exports of other machinery and equipment grow by 1.8% and 3.3%, respectively. Given that those sectors produce with an intensive use of labor, skilled and unskilled workers gain the most among production sectors. However, reallocation of resources to the liberalized sectors and comparative disadvantage of Indonesia in RCEP markets in wearing apparel, textiles, chemicals, transport and electronic equipment lead to lower output and exports in these sectors. Reduction of Indonesian trade barriers is also projected to induce an increase of imports in all sectors (except textiles), with the highest changes in food processing and agriculture, as well as in services (see Figure 7 ).
15 Exports of services decline together with an increase of imports. This happens due to higher domestic demand for services which are often used as intermediate inputs and can be used at a lower price after trade liberalization. The two strongly expanding sectors -food processing and machinery and equipment -benefit from better access to cheaper intermediates after the trade agreement as their share of intermediate inputs amounts to 68% and 63%, respectively. In particular, the initial share of imported food and agricultural products used as intermediate input in food processing accounts for over 17% which also explains a strong increase of imports in these sectors. Moreover, import intensity of output slightly increases in food processing (0.4 percentage points) indicating an increased demand for imported intermediates. Other machinery and equipment has initially the highest overall share of imported intermediates across all sectors (65%) and benefits from better access to e.g. metal (16% of all intermediate inputs) and chemical products (13% of intermediate inputs). Due to the lower import intensity of output in machinery and equipment (-1.9 percentage points), domestic supply of intermediate machinery products increases to provide 33% of all intermediate inputs in this sector. As for services, the output and imports of trade and transport services expand due to the expansion in the production of other sectors which utilize these services as inputs. For instance, these services constitute over 20% of total intermediate inputs in food processing and other machinery and equipment.
In comparison to the EU-IDN CEPA and RCEP, the implementation of the CPTPP (TPP-11) would have negligible impact on Indonesia as the country does not take part into the agreement. The expected impact on real GDP and income is negligible (see Figure 2 and Table 2 ), while in fact exports and imports contract slightly due to the trade diversion away from Indonesia to the CPTPP members (e.g., Indonesian exports to the TPP-11 members contract by almost 3%). A similar picture would arise in case of TPP including the United States (TPP-12), with an even stronger fall of total trade flows.
On the other hand, joining an expanded CPTPP (TPP-15) along with Korea and Thailand would increase Indonesian GDP by 0.58%. Reduction of trade barriers leads to higher exports and imports, which expand by over 2% relative to the baseline while exports to the TPP-15 members increase by almost 14%.
The estimated trade weighted average tariff that Indonesia faces in TPP-15 markets is close to zero. Only wearing apparel and leather products face a quite high tariff of 5.9% (see Figure 8 ). In contrast, the trade-weighted average NTM in TPP-15 markets is equal to 5.53% (see Table 1 ) while country-specific values range from 3% in Chile up to 16% in the Philippines. The highest barriers have been estimated in communication and business services, financial and business services, trade and transport services, social services and construction (see Figure 8 ).
Joining the TPP-15 is likely to significantly reduce NTMs faced by Indonesia. On the basis of the original TPP commitments, Petri and Plummer (2016) estimate a potential average reduction of ad valorem equivalent of NTMs of 3.26% (see Table 1 ). In particular, a strong decline of NTMs is observed for Indonesian food products in Peru of 31 percentage points; in services for communication and business services in Mexico (39 percentage points) as well as for construction in the case of Peru (36 percentage points). The trade weighted ad valorem equivalent of NTMs across sectors are the highest in communication and business services (15.74 percentage points), finance and other business services (10.05 percentage points), trade and transport services (7.83 percentage points), and food processing (9.58 percentage points) ( Figure 8 ).
On the sectoral level, trade liberalization between the TPP-15 members leads to a strong increase of output and exports in sectors such as transport equipment (10.3% and 30.9%), wearing apparel and leather (8.5% and 13.2%), as well as machinery and equipment (6.28% and 13.30, respectively). For services, we observe a slight increase of output (under 1%), 16 that comes together with increased imports and even reduced exports in case of construction, finance and other business services. This illustrates the increased demand for services as inputs for production. The losing sectors that contract their production include only natural resources, food processing and agriculture.
Compared to the TPP-15 scenario, the benefits for Indonesia would be even higher in case of FTAAP implementation, which spans a wider regional membership (Figure 1 above) . Enlarging the TPP-15 into FTAAP would increase the GDP gain from 0.58% to 0.89% and raise exports and imports by 4.97% and 4.75% compared to the baseline, respectively (Figure 2 and Table 2 ). Indonesian exports to the FTAAP member countries would increase by almost 12%, while some 16 Except for communication and business services, where output remains almost unchanged while imports increase the strongest among all services sectors. trade diversion away from non-member states is expected with a fall of exports by 4.2%. In general, the share of non-member countries in Indonesian exports drops from 41.9% to 38.2%, while the one of FTAAP members increases by 3.7 percentage points (from 58.1% to 61.8%).
These higher benefits of FTAAP are due to improved access to a higher number of markets that account for 56% of global output and over one third of world trade, while its share of intra-RTA trade amounts to 65% of members' total trade (World Bank, 2016a) . Moreover, the FTAAP agreement is associated with a lower degree of liberalization of tariffs and NTMs as compared to the TPP, so the potential reductions in trade barriers are higher. In particular, the trade weighted average NTM that Indonesia faces on the FTAAP markets drops by 3.3 percentage points from 6.7% to 3.4%. The Indonesian trade weighted NTM also falls from 4.26% to 2.5% (Table 1) .
Regarding tariffs, they also decline, even though with a lower magnitude: the trade weighted average tariff that Indonesia faces on the FTAAP markets falls from 1% to 0.1%, while the Indonesian average tariff against other FTAAP countries declines from 0.7% to 0.15%. On the sectoral level, the highest initial tariffs that Indonesia faces on the FTAAP markets is in wearing apparel (11.3%) and textiles (5.2%), while for NTMs the highest values occur in communication and business services (47.2%), construction (42.1%), financial (33.1%), as well as trade and transport services (28.3%). Given the relatively high initial trade barriers in textiles and apparel, these sectors expand their output and exports the most. The increase in production of wearing apparel equals to 21.4%, while its exports rise by 33.1%. For textiles, the respective values are 17.9% and 37.2%. Among the biggest losers, we find the same sectors as in case of TPP-15, namely food processing and agriculture, which reduce their production by 2.2% and 1%.
Export diversion by destination and sector
While aggregate gains in output and trade volumes are important to define the extent of benefits that would come to realization after the implementation of PTAs; changes in the composition and direction of trade are, in contrast, major determinants on the sectoral composition of those gains. Quantifying the extent of gains and losses across and within countries is crucial to define policyoptions that compensate losers, and hence reduce resistance and move negotiation agendas in favor of more ambitious and beneficial agreements.
In case of Indonesia and the PTAs analyzed in this paper, the larger aggregate gains would come from the implementation of the EU-IDN, FTAAP, and TPP-15 agreements, depicted in Figure 9 below. As expected, the share of Indonesian exports directed to the European continent would increase from 9.7 percent of total exports in the baseline, to 18.5 percent in the EU-Indonesia FTA; or from $48 billion to $98 billion in exports in 2030. FTAAP, in contrast, redirects exports to the United States, $19 billion more in exports with respect to the baseline, or a shift from 8.7 to 12 percent of total exports. TPP-15 would encourage exports to countries that are part of the TPP-20 block excluding the United States (Canada, Mexico, Chile, Peru) increasing their export volume in 2030 by $10 billion or increasing from 1.4 to 3.3 percent of total exports. growing sectors would be located within the TPP-RCEP block, excluding the United States, the European Union, and China.
Productivity kick
The results described above do not incorporate gains in productivity due to trade liberalization and increased openness as the analysis only captures the reallocation of production to the most efficient sectors. However, several studies (e.g., Topalova, 2004; Amiti and Konings, 2007; Yu, 2015) show that lower import tariffs for final goods increase firms' productivity by inducing tougher import competition, while cheaper intermediates can improve productivity via learning, variety and quality effects. In particular, Amiti and Konings (2007) find that a 10 percentage point fall in input tariffs leads to a productivity gain of 12 percent for Indonesian manufacturing firms that import their inputs. For Chinese manufacturing firms, Yu (2015) illustrates that a 10 percentage point fall in output (input) tariffs leads to a productivity gain of 9.2% (5.1%). Moreover, the author concludes that import trade liberalization contributes at least 14.5% to economy-wide productivity growth in China.
To illustrate an upper bound of the possible gains from different PTAs, we run the same scenarios with additional productivity gains based on trade-weighted average reduction of tariffs over the FTA members under each scenario (see Table 3 for details). In particular, we follow one of the most conservative empirical estimates of such productivity kick (Topalova, 2004) and assume that a 10% decrease in protection leads to a 0.5 percentage points productivity gain. Table 3 illustrates the calculated trade weighted average reduction of tariffs and corresponding productivity gains in Indonesia for all simulations.
Assuming this productivity kick greatly enhances the positive economic impacts of all of the PTAs (see Figure 2 and Table 2 above). Compared to the standard setup, GDP increase is boosted by 0.22 percentage points in the case of RCEP and up to 7 percentage points in the case of EU-Indonesia FTA. Due to the highest reduction in trade-weighted average tariff in the case of the EU-IDN CEPA (see Table 3 ), the productivity kick is the highest among all the simulations which leads to the strong increase of gains with the trade flows expanding by more than 13%. 
Distributional impacts of the PTAs
Next we translate these macro-economic effects into distributional effects using the GIDD microsimulation model. The key macro-micro results are reported in Table A2 in Annex 2. We first simulate the evolution of the distribution of income up to 2030 to create the baseline and then compare the results of the PTAs to this baseline.
Extreme poverty in Indonesia has steadily declined since the mid-1980s. The percentage of people living with less than PPP$1.90 a day fell from 70.3% in 1984 to 9.3% by 2013. 17 During this period, Indonesia successfully managed to keep the long-term pace of poverty reduction vis-à-vis other developing countries. Recent data show that Indonesia's poverty rate was, nonetheless, 5.8 percentage points above the East Asia & the Pacific regional average and 7.2 points above the poverty level of upper-middle income countries.
It is projected that close to 39 million will be lifted from poverty by 2030. Under baseline, historical trends on poverty reduction and shared prosperity are projected to continue. Household consumption per capita, the main driver of poverty reduction, would grow at 3.9% per annum. The headcount ratio (%) of extreme poverty using a poverty line adequate for countries with lowermiddle income status, at $3.20 a day, is projected to decline from 31.4% in 2016 to 14.5% by 2030. 18 This represents a decline from 81.9 million in 2016 to 43 million living in poverty by 2030. In a similar fashion, poverty using a higher poverty line of PPP$5.50 a day, adequate for countries in upper-middle income status, would decline from 62.8% to 40%; or from 163.6 million to 118.1 million by 2030 ( Figure 12a ).
Growth in household consumption is expected not to be equally shared by all segments of the population. The macro-micro simulation framework captures dynamic changes in the distribution of income through a series of simulation steps, which include (a) demographic and educational composition of the population, (b) sectoral reallocation of labor, (c) movements in skill-premia and (d) changes in relative prices of consumption goods.
For the baseline, each one of these effects is decomposed in Figure 11 below. With respect to (a) demographic and educational change, modest regressive changes to the distribution of income are generated from the projected expansion of the supply of skilled labor. As expected, intra-group inequality is higher for skilled labor and this group is projected to increase its share in total employment from 36.8% in 2015 to 42.3% by 2030 ( Figure 12b ). The sectoral reallocation of labor (step (b)) helps offset the regressive effects of step (a) by allowing labor to move away from the low-wage and shrinking agricultural sector to the expanding non-agricultural sectors of the economy.
Step (c) modifies skilled wage premia by sector in line with general equilibrium conditions. This step typically generates strong regressive effects in the baseline as the overall structure of the economy shifts away from agriculture towards skill-intensive manufacturing and services as a result of a rapid capital expansion. This shift in the economic structure determines a relative increase in the demand for both skilled labor and capital. Lastly, (d) the effect of consumption prices is slightly regressive considering that under baseline conditions the inflation of non-food items is slower than that of food prices, resulting from general-equilibrium conditions. The combined effect of these mechanisms is regressive under baseline conditions, making the ratio of average income of the top-60 to the bottom-40 percent increase from 3.7 to 4.0 percent ( Figure  12c ) and the Gini coefficient to increase from 40.6 to 44.2 (Figure 12d ). The EU-IDN, FTAAP, and TPP-15 scenarios all lead to further poverty reduction, but also to increased inequality. Figure 13a shows the growth incidence curves for each one of these three scenarios and Figure 14a shows their effects on poverty reduction. The relative size of the macroeconomic effects of the different PTAs is in line with that of both overall growth and poverty reduction. The EU-IDN CEPA yield the largest poverty reduction effect for a line of PPP$5.50 a Indonesia: Skilled labor, % of total employment Agriculture Non-Agriculture day with 3.3 million lifted above the poverty line, followed by the FTAAP (2.1 million) and . At the same time, the shape of the growth incidence curve also suggest that more ambitious agreements tend to concentrate larger gains in richer segments of the population, particularly in the case of the most ambitious of all, i.e. the EU-IDN CEPA (Figure 13a ).
In contrast, RCEP and CPTPP (TPP-11) scenarios offer lower gains in terms of poverty reduction but better distributional outcomes. The RCEP scenario generates a reduction in poor people by 0.3 million for the PPP$3.20 a day line and by 0.8 million for the PPP$3.20 a day line ( Figure 14b) . The growth incidence curve (Figure 13b) shows that CPTPP might have a negative impact on the middle-class, sending more people -0.3 million -below the poverty at the PPP$5.50 a day. 14a. EU-IDN, FTAAP and TPP-15 scenarios 14b. RCEP and TPP-11 scenarios Incidence curves in Figure 15 below depict deviations from baseline conditions that result from each additional simulation step, by scenario. The larger net effects are caused by growth. Indeed, the EU-IDN CEPA yields the highest expected growth of income relative to the other PTAs at every point of the income distribution. The distributional effects are relatively smaller, considering that at most they account for around 1.75 percent deviations in per capita household consumption from baseline conditions, after growth. In all cases, sectoral reallocation of labor contributes only marginally to changes in the income distribution. This follows from the assumption of fixed labor, for instance PTAs are assumed not to change the willingness of people to join the labor force.
The size of the gains grows monotonically with income for the EU-IDN CEPA while the growth incidence curve has a U-shape in the case of RCEP, and a mildly inverted U-shape for the other agreements. The regressive nature of the EU-IDN CEPA is mainly due to the increase in skill wage premia spurred by the additional demand for skill intensive sectors, services in particular. Changes in wage premia are more pronounced when the effect of growth is larger, such as in the EU-IDN FTA and the FTAAP. On the other hand, the progressive effect of food prices tends to dominate in the case of RCEP, thus determining the progressive nature of the gains in the RCEP scenario. 19 19 Note that the food price channel is always progressive except in the EU-IDN CEPA where it is slightly regressive. 
Conclusions
With the flurry of new, more complex bilateral and regional PTAs, it is become more important to carefully assess their economic impacts. This paper has provided macro-and micro-estimates of the impacts of various important agreements currently negotiated or potentially negotiated by the largest economy in Southeast Asia -Indonesia. To that end, it has employed state-of-the-art simulation methods, including a dynamic multi-country global CGE model and a micro-simulation tool linking the macro-economic results to the household level.
The results suggest that of the PTAs under investigation, the EU-CEPA would yield the largest macro-economic gains for Indonesia in terms of income, output and exports. This large impact is mainly driven by the high expected reductions in trade barriers and the high share of international trade between Indonesia and the EU. Indonesia would gain substantially also if it decides to join 
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Growth Incidence Curve with respect to Baseline, 2030 the CPTPP and the FTAAP due to the size of the markets and the ambition of the commitments. On the other hand, RCEP is expected to yield lower gains as members have already achieved a relatively high degree of liberalization among themselves and there is little prospect to significantly advance that level.
These macro effects translate into commensurate reductions of poverty. The EU-IDN CEPA yields the highest expected growth of income relative to the other PTAs at every point of the income distribution. However, the size of the gains grows monotonically with income for the EU-IDN CEPA while the growth incidence curve has a U-shape in the case of RCEP, and a mildly inverted U-shape for the other agreements. The regressive gains of the EU-IDN CEPA are mainly due to the increase in skill wage premia spurred by the additional demand for skill intensive sectors, services in particular.
These results could help policy makers evaluate the relative desirability of the various agreements -even when considering them in combination -according to the goals of their policies. They could also help prepare them in devising compensation strategies as well as policies to help a smoother reallocation of resources.
Despite the advances in the modeling, there is still much need to improve on the analyses of these new generation agreements. A key area is the modeling of non-trade-related barriers, such as investment, competition and labor regulation issues, which form an increasingly more important part of these agreements.
Annex 1 Global Income Distribution Dynamics Model
We use the Global Income Distribution Dynamics (GIDD) model, developed by Bussolo, De Hoyos and Medvedev (2010) , to estimate distributional effects. GIDD is a "top-down" micro simulation framework that exploits heterogeneity observed in household surveys to distribute macroeconomic shocks. These shocks are aligned with a macroeconomic model such as the CGE model used in this paper. More specifically, we impose consistency between the GIDD and the CGE models in this paper in various ways. First, both use the same United Nations projections in aggregate population and age and education structures. The GIDD then uses estimates from the CGE model as inputs into the household model. In particular, as inputs into the calculation of changes in per capita household income, the GIDD uses CGE model estimates of differentiated wages for skilled, unskilled, agricultural and non-agricultural labor and changes in the prices of agricultural and non-agricultural goods. 20 Finally, all household incomes are adjusted proportionally so that the percentage change in the aggregate of household incomes in the GIDD is consistent with the CGE model's estimate of the percentage change in real income.
GIDD was developed by the World Bank and was inspired by previous efforts involving simulation exercises (Francois Bourguignon, Bussolo, & Pereira da Silva, 2008; François Bourguignon, Ferreira, & Leite, 2008; Davies, 2009) . Previous examples of application using CGE outputs and GIDD include the effect of agriculture distortions in the global economy (Bussolo et al., 2010; Dessus, Herrera, & de Hoyos, 2008) , the effect of demographic change on Africa and external and internal shocks in Africa (Devarajan et al., 2015) .
The first step in the microsimulation exercise is to implement a set of changes in the household surveys' demographic structure. The population growth adjustment is particularly important in countries with high fertility rates, such as those in Sub-Saharan African. In practical terms, the adjustment for population growth allows the analysis to explicitly take into account changes in the size of the working-age population. We perform population and education projections during the first stage of the micro-simulation model and in creating the Business as Usual scenario for the CGE model. For each country, we construct the demographic profile in two steps. First, the age and gender composition is exogenously determined following medium variant estimates from the World Population Prospects (United Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2015). In a second step, following Bourguignon and Bussolo (2013) , country-specific educational profiles are constructed using initial educational achievement levels observed in the household surveys with some conservative yet simple assumptions about educational progress.
More specifically, starting with the household surveys, the country-specific demographic profiles are constructed by partitioning each country's total population into: (1) 16 age-groups (0-4, 5-9, 10-14, …, 65-69, 70-74, 75; (2) two gender groups; and (3) three different levels of educational attainment: (i) Noeducation or primary; (ii) secondary; and (iii) tertiary education. As mentioned earlier, age and gender totals are based on data from the United Nations' (2015) medium variant population projections. In terms of education, we assume that as the population ages, the average educational attainment in a country increases through a pure pipeline effect, as younger and more educated cohorts replace older cohorts. For example, if at time t half of the population in the cohort formed by individuals between 25 and 30 years of age have post-secondary education, then after 10 years (at t+10), half of the population between 35 and 40 will have post-secondary education. Furthermore, for younger cohorts we imposed the assumption that , , ,
We may calculate the left hand side of equation 5, since the three values on the right hand side are known from equations 1, 2, and 3. Equation 5 implies that even if initial wages differ between the CGE and micro models, the percentage change in the wage gaps will be consistent across the two models. By passing on percentage changes in wage premia by type of worker, instead of percentage changes in wages, the possibility of wage gaps moving in opposite directions in the macro and household data is eliminated. Within each group of workers, distributional changes occur; but, on average, for any group of workers, the relative wages for each type of worker are constrained to be consistent with the corresponding growth rates from the CGE model.
Given the known values in equations 1-5, and defining average wages for unskilled labor in agriculture as numeraire in the GIDD, so that ′ , ′ , , it is possible to calculate the percentage changes in average wage income of households in sector s and skill level e that are consistent with wage gaps expressed in / as the per capita income of household h in the benchmark equilibrium, where , is the income of the ith member of household h, and n is equal to the size of household h; . similarly, define ∑ , ∈ / where , and , are the unadjusted and adjusted values, respectively, of the income of the ith member of household h in the counterfactual of the micromodel; the role of is explained by equation 14 below. Then define as the weighted average value of real per capita income across all households, i.e., ∑ =
where is the weight of household h in aggregate income in the benchmark. Correspondingly ∑ (9) <note -skipped equation 8?> is the weighted average per capita income value in the policy simulation. Note that ∑ 1, ∑ 1 and is a scalar. Equations 11 and 12 allow for different household weights since the weights of the households will typically change over time. So that the percentage change in the aggregate value of household income is consistent with the CGE model, we constrain by equation 13:
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We implement this constraint in a distribution neutral way. That is, we adjust all household income in the counterfactual by a scalar such that per capita household income equals : as a result, can be defined by:
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Despite the fact that the GIDD ignores other forms of income, such as capital income, this transformation guarantees consistency between the weighted average household income assessment and the CGE model assessment. For poor households, which is the main focus of our work, the assumption should be reasonably accurate, since poor households have little capital income. There is more of a margin of error for wealthier households. But for these households, it is skilled labor rather than unskilled labor that tends to be more important and Bussolo et al., (2010) have noted a tendency for skilled wage and returns to capital to be correlated.
Finally, macroeconomic estimates of changes in agricultural and non-agricultural prices are distributed across heterogeneous households using the following method. Let us define the initial per capita monetary income of household h, , and the purchasing power of household h, , as the ratio of its monetary income divided by a household-specific price index capturing the household's consumption patterns in terms of food and non-food expenditure:
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where P f and P nf are food and non-food price indices and α is the proportion of household's h budget spent on food.
The parameter in the denominator of the right hand side of Equation 12 can be estimated with household data using the following specification:
ln 13
where e h is a vector of household-specific errors that are assumed to be distributed with 0 and . Assuming that estimated parameters and remain constant, the new budget share spent on food for household h, , at the counterfactual per capita income, , can obtained from:
ln ̂ 14
The changes in real per capita incomes brought about by a change in relative prices of food versus nonfood can be approximated by the following linear expression:
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where in Equation 15 is the real per capita income adjusted for changes in relative prices of food versus non-food.
is the counterfactual measure of real per capita income of household h for the analysis of poverty and shared prosperity. For each scenario, Table A2 shows the magnitude of the LINKAGE aggregate variables that are obtained from the general equilibrium macro model and that are later used in each one step of the microsimulation framework. The table shows annual percentage changes for the baseline scenario and, for each of the alternative scenarios, percentage point deviations with respect to the baseline. Household consumption is expected to grow at an annual rate of 3.9 percent shifting demand towards the non-agricultural sector, which tends to be more skill-intensive. Partly driven by semiexogenous assumptions on education projections, labor in the non-agricultural sector grows 1.37 percent for the skilled and 1.14 for the unskilled, on an annual basis. With overall shift in final demand towards services and skilled-intensive manufacturing, the general equilibrium effect increases wages for skilled relative to unskilled workers and prices of food relative to non-food prices; with both effects having regressive consequences in the baseline. 
